Abstract: We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.
Introduction
The dependence of an agent's utility on the identity of the members of his or her coalition was recognized in the seminal paper of [1] , and formally introduced as a hedonic coalition formation game by [2, 3] . The model consists of two components, namely, a finite set of players and a preference relation for each player defined over the coalitions that a player may belong to. The outcome of such a game is a partition of the player set into coalitions called a coalition structure.
In this paper we extend the hedonic coalition formation model by distinguishing between three different types of players and allowing for agents' preferences to be type-dependent. Our model can also be seen as an extension of the three-sided matching model in which agents' preferences are defined over subsets of players from all possible players' types. Within this framework, we study the existence of coalition structures that are immune against coalitional deviations.
As it is well known (cf. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] ), one needs strong restrictions on agents' preferences even for the standard three-sided matching model to assure that a stable three-sided matching exists. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the more general game we consider, suitable preference restrictions are needed to show the existence of a core stable coalition structure. In particular, we assume players' preferences to be based on the substitutability between local and global status that an agent attains in the corresponding coalitions (cf. [10, 11] ). In this framework, we show that if global status is weighted in a balanced way, then a core stable coalition structure always exists.
Notation and Definitions
Let N a , N b , and N c be three disjoint and finite sets of agents of type a, b, and c, respectively. For
coalitions containing i. A partition π of N is called a coalition structure. For each coalition structure π and each player i ∈ N , we denote by π(i) the coalition in π containing player i, i.e., π(i) ∈ π and i ∈ π(i). Further, we assume that each player i ∈ N is endowed with a preference i over N i , i.e., a binary relation over N i which is reflexive, complete, and transitive. Denote by i and ∼ i the strict and indifference relation associated with i and by := ( 1 , 2 , . . . , n ) a profile of preferences i for all i ∈ N . A player's preference relation over coalitions canonically induces a preference relation over coalition structures in the following way: For any two coalition structures π and π , player i weakly prefers π to π if and only if he weakly prefers "his" coalition in π to the one in π , i.e., π i π if and only if π(i) i π(i). Hence, we assume that players' preferences over coalition structures are purely hedonic. That means, they are completely characterized by their preferences over coalitions. Finally, a hedonic game (N, ) is a pair consisting of the set of players and a preference profile. Given a hedonic game (N, ), a coalition structure π of N is core stable if there does not exist a nonempty coalition X such that X i π(i) holds for each i ∈ X.
Balanced Weights and Status-Based Preferences
Let |N a | = n a , N b = n b , and |N c | = n c with n a ≤ n b ≤ n c . We assume that every agent
is assigned a rank r i d which induces a unique ordering of agents within each type such that any two consecutive players' ranks differ by one unit. The highest ranked agents of each type all have rank n c , and the lowest ranked agents in the sets N a , N b , and N c have ranks n c − n a + 1, n c − n b + 1, and 1, respectively. We take the rank of the empty set to be equal to zero. Underlying the ranking of agents may be a distribution of abilities or material endowment. By letting the highest ranked agents of all types have equal ranks we rule out scale effects. The assumption that the lowest ranked a-agent may have a higher rank than the lowest ranked b-and c-agent reflects the scarcity of a-type individuals relative to those of b-and c-types. In addition to his preference i a , each agent i a ∈ N a is characterized by a non-negative weight (2) for each d ∈ {a, b, c}, and all
One possible interpretation of such a restriction on the weights is as follows. Each agent has exactly one unit of communication time that is efficiently allocated between the other two types of groups, as reflected in (1) . Similarly, condition (2) imposes that the communication time of agents of two different types with agents of the third type sums up to one. It follows from the balancedness condition that assigning a value to some w 1 Thus, this condition inherits and strengthens the spirit of cyclicity from the standard three-sided matching model (cf. [5] ). By using the above setup, let us now define agents' preferences in a hedonic game with status-based preferences and balanced weights.
and only if
Thus, in such a hedonic game, each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups (cf. [11] ). Moreover, each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.
Theorem 1 Let (N, ) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences and balanced weights. Then the set of core stable coalition structures is non-empty.
Consider the coalition structure π = {N }. We will show that π is core stable. Let Y ⊆ N and d ∈ {a, b, c}. In what follows we will denote by r
First, for all d ∈ {a, b, c} we have by construction that
In addition, since the highest ranked agents in all types have the same rank and the weights are balanced, we have for the status of agent i d ∈ N d in the coalition structure π = {N } that
Next, we will show that there is no coalition X ⊆ N that blocks the constructed coalition structure π. Suppose, on the contrary, that such a coalition exists.
First, suppose that X ⊆ N d for some d ∈ {a, b, c}. Let j be the lowest ranked member of X. This agent's status in X is given by
The same agent's status in π, however, is given by
This establishes a contradiction to X blocking π. Suppose next that agents of all the types are contained in X and let X ∩ N a = A, X ∩ N b = B, and
and i c ∈ C one should have
,
Summing up, we get
Since the weights are balanced, we have
which is a contradiction. Take finally the case where X contains two agents' types, say a and b, and let X ∩ N a = A and
As X is a blocking coalition, one should have for i a ∈ A and i b ∈ B that
Summing up, and applying the balancedness of the weights, we get
, and
, we have again a contradiction. We conclude that X cannot block π = {N }.
Next we study in more detail the core stable outcomes when there is an equal number of a-, b-, and c-type of agents. For this, we need to introduce some new notation. Let d ∈ {a, b, c}. We denote by 
Theorem 2 Let (N, ) be a hedonic game with status-based preferences and balanced weights, and
Proof. Take π ∈ Π and suppose that there is a coalition X that blocks π.
Consider first the case where X contains only one type of agents. Then, one should have
which is a contradiction. Thus, X cannot be blocking π. Suppose next that X contains two agents' types, say a and b (considering other two agents' types does not alter the proof argument), and let X ∩ N a = A and X ∩ N b = B. For i a ∈ A and i b ∈ B one should then have
which is a contradiction since w 
which is again a contradiction since the weights are balanced. We conclude that π is core stable. Notice that the reverse implication of Theorem 2 does not hold as the following example shows.
The agents are ranked as follows:
, and r 3 d = 3 for each d ∈ {a, b, c}. Let the weight vector be such that w
It is easy to compute the status of each agent in π:
= 2.25, and
25. We will show that π is core stable. As every agent's status in π is at least as high as when being alone, no agent can block π by himself. Moreover, it is clear from the proof of Theorem 1 that there cannot be a blocking coalition X ⊆ N d with |X| ≥ 2 for any d ∈ {a, b, c} (the status of the lowest ranked member of X is non-positive).
Furthermore, notice that r
there is a blocking coalition
there must be agents i b , i c ∈ X for whom
Summing up, we get −0.5 · j∈B r j |B| + k∈C r k |C| > 0. This leads to a contradiction as a group's average rank is strictly positive. Next, suppose that X ⊆ N a ∪N b with X ∩N a = A = ∅ and X ∩N b = B = ∅. One can show that if π is blocked by X, then for an agent i b ∈ B, it must hold that
which implies that 0.5 · i∈A r i |A| > j∈B r j |B| . This is only satisfied in the case when j∈B r j |B| = 1 and
has no incentive to participate in X as his ranking in this case would be 2 − 2.5 + 0.5 · 1 = 1 which equals his ranking in the partition π. Analogously, if A = {3 a }, then the ranking of 3 a in X would be
, i.e., agent 3 a has no incentive to participate in X either. Similarly, one can show that there is no coalition X ⊆ N a ∪ N c with X ∩ N a = ∅ and X ∩ N c = ∅ which blocks π. Last, suppose that there is a blocking coalition X with X ∩ N a = A = ∅, X ∩ N b = B = ∅ and
Consider an agent i b ∈ B and an agent i c ∈ C. If π is blocked by X, this implies that
Notice finally that, for X to block π, one should have for each i a ∈ A that
for each i a ∈ A. This implies that 3 a ∈ A. In addition, recall that i∈A r i |A| > 1.5. Since 3 a ∈ A, this implies that 1 a ∈ A, hence, A = {2 a }. Therefore, 1 b ∈ B and 1 c ∈ C, which in turn implies that B = ∅ and C = ∅ as no agent among 2 b , 3 b , 2 c and 3 c can obtain a higher status.
Let us finally consider a hedonic game with status-based preferences and individual weights that are defined on coalitions and are, therefore, not balanced. As our last example shows, a core stable coalition structure may fail to exist in this case. We will show that there is no core stable coalition structure. 
